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as to indicate an individual liability, but the court by way of dictum
clearly indicated its belief that the president by a proper signature,
if acting within the scope of his authority, could bind the corporation
without any written authorization.

".

.

. While an executive officer

of a corporation is in a sense, an agent, he is more than that; he is
the alter ego of the corporation. A signing by him is generally considered to be the act of the corporation itself and not the act of an
agent. Hence a signing by him, while acting on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of his authority, satisfies the statute requiring a signing by the party to be charged and not authorizing a
signing by an agent. Also, although there is authority to the contrary, he is not an agent within the meaning of statutes requiring the
authority of an agent to sign to be in writing...... 3' There are faint

indications in opposition to this view in two New York lower court
decisions; 36 but in those cases the court never had occasion to consider the distinction between executive officers and ordinary agents,
and hence their dicta are of little weight.
Since executive corporate officers may well be considered as
quasi-principals rather than agents, the majority position seems sound
in not requiring such officers to have written authority where they
are acting within the scope of their implied powers. The policy of
the statutes, to prevent frauds, would appear to be satisfied by demanding written authority in the case of minor agents while permitting major officials to act just as if they themselves were principals.
It would be unduly cumbersome to demand that such major officials
obtain written authority from the board of directors or stockholders
in every instance in which the agency provisions of the Statutes of
Frauds are involved.
ANDREW

DOES

P.

DONOVAN.

ENTRY UNDER VOID PAROL LEASE CREATE TENANCY FROM
YEAR TO YEAR IN NEW YORK

In these postwar days of housing shortages and scarcity of business sites, the legal problems presented by parol leases, which are
voidable under the Statute of Frauds,1 are rarely encountered. The
35 Id. at 15. The court here adopts a quotation from 37 C. J. S. Frauds,
Statute of, § 207 (1943), as its own.
36 Karnal v. Horovitz, 187 Misc. 851, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Klores v. Empire Title & Guarantee Co., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
1 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242. "An estate or interest in real property,
other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, . . . can not be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law,
or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent,
thereunto authorized by writing. ... "
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quite obvious reason for this circumstance springs from the well
known principle of supply and demand. This principle gives to the
landowner a measure of power and control,2 as respects those who
are desirous of becoming his tenants, which power formerly rested
with the prospective tenants. Thus, we find at the present time,
that in most instances where the relationship of landlord and tenant
is newly created, a proper and binding lease is formulated in written
form. It is, however, to be hoped, that in the not too distant future
there will once again, be an adequate supply of homes and commercial properties. Of course, this will place the landlord and tenant on
at least a par and may even tilt the scales beyond the balancing point,
giving rise to demands by the prospective tenant upon the landlord,
in which the latter will no doubt acquiesce as he did prior to this
period of shortages. The probable result will be an increase in the
number of parol leases and a fortiori a prevalence of the problems
created by them. With an eye to the future, let us now, in the light
of the past, consider one of the main difficulties created by the void
parol lease. Let us first observe some basic elements before taking
the problem in its entirety.
The Statute of Frauds provides that a parol lease for longer
than one year, is void. The statute has been judicially interpreted
in New York as meaning voidable or unenforceable rather than void.
It follows then, that if the statute is not invoked, the parties being
willing, a valid relationship may be established under the parol lease.
Once the relationship of landlord and tenant has been established, we
find within that relationship tenancies of varying duration and it is
with the periods of notice required to terniinate these tenancies that
we should first concern ourselves. Directing our efforts along these
lines we find that the New York Real Property Law fixes the following requirements of notice to bring to an end various tenancies.
Within the limits of the city of New York, the landlord must give
the tenant notice of termination at least thirty days before the expiration of the term and this notice must be given to determine both3
a tenancy for a month certain and a tenancy from month to month.
Outside the city of New York, the notice period for both types of
tenancies is one
4 month, and the notice must be given by either land-

lord or tenant.

2This power and control is limited by the presently existing emergency,
housing and rent control authorities.
3 N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 232-a. This section is solely for benefit of tenants and does not impose, by implication, a reciprocal obligation on tenants to
give 30 days' prior notice to landlord of intention to vacate. Andriola v.
Huber, 181 Misc. 764, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 617 (Mun. Ct. 1944); T. I. B. Corporation v. Repetto, 174 Misc. 501, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd
without ophtion, 261 App. Div. 813, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 782 (1st Dep't 1941).
Contra: Sample v. Fitzsimmons, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1940), no opinion;
Ct. 1940), no opinion.
Finck
4 v. Forman, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 389 (Sup.
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 232-b.
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It is to be noted at this point, that no statutory requirements,
concerning notice of termination, are set forth in the Real Property
Law, with respect to tenancies for a period certain of longer duration
than one month. Resorting to case law, we find that when a tenancy
for a definite term of years exists, no notice of termination need be
given by either party to the relationship, and the tenancy automatically determines at the end of the period certain, 5 either through the
passage of time or the occurrence of an event which marks the terminus of the period. 6 The agreement limits the tenancy. To be
sure, there may be a provision in the lease which calls for notice and
in such case
there must be compliance with requirements of the
7
instrument.
To ascertain the period of notice required to be given in a tenancy from year to year, we must again resort to case law, for statutory directions are lacking in New York. Although the parties to
the lease may themselves fix both the length of the notice and the
time for giving it,8 in the absence of such stipulations the common
law requires a half year notice.9 Too, such notice must be timely, 10
so that the end of the six months does not extend beyond the end

Allen v. Jaquish, 21 Wend. 628 (N. Y. 1839); Monaghan v. Kane, 186
Misc. 698, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (Co. Ct. 1946) ; Arthur Equities, Inc. v. Horlly,
Misc. -, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 17 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Some states, by statute,
require notice to be given by the landlord. Hull v. Laugharn 3 Cal. App. 2d
310, 39 P. 2d 478 (1934); Hirzel v. Silker, 4 W. W. Harr. 988 , 156 Atl. 360
(Del. 1930). And by the tenant. Hirzel v. Silker, supra.
6Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 489 (1871); Hunt v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 665
(N. Y. 1836); Scheele v. Waldman, 136 App. Div. 679, 121 N. Y. Supp. 486
(2d Dep't 1910); Right v. Darby, 1 T. R. 159, 99 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1786);
Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282, 97 Eng. Rep. 315 (1757); Hughes and
Crowther's Case, 13 Co. 66, 77 Eng. Rep. 1476 (1616). A lease for a term
of years made by one of two partners for the purposes of the business, is
subject to the continuance of the business, and the lease determines without

notice on the dissolution of the partnership. Johnson v. Hartshorne, 52 N. Y.
173 (1873); Doe v. Miles, 1 Stark. 181, 171 Eng. Rep. 439 (1816); Doe v.
Bluck, 8 C. & P. 464, 173 Eng. Rep. 577 (1838).
7 M. Fine Realty Co. v. New York, 53 Misc. 246, 103 N. Y. Supp. 115
(Sup. Ct. 1907).; Carlisle v. Weiscopf, 237 Mass. 183, 129 N. E. 375 (1921);
Brown v. Trumper, 26 Beav. 11, 53 Eng. Rep. 800 (1858).
8 Bridges

v. Potts, 17 C. B. N. S. 314, 144 Eng. Rep. 127 (1864).

Tenant

may quit on happening of specified event. Bethell v. Blencowe, 3 Man. & G.
119, 133 Eng. Rep. 1081 (1841). When notice is fixed by agreement, it must
be given in accordance with such agreement and supersedes the common law
requirement of six months. Heyman v. Robertson, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (1st
Dept 1914), or any statutory provisions. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Bismarck

Comm. Co., 41 N. D. 490, 171 N. W. 623 (1919).
9 Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298 (1890) ; Doe v. Lines, 11
Q. B. 402, 116 Eng. Rep. 527 (1848); Doe v. Smaridge, 7 Q. B. 957, 115 Eng.
Rep. 748 (1845). Contra: Matter of Steele, 154 App. Div. 860, 139 N. Y.
Supp. 550 (4th Dep't 1913). Some states have not adopted this common law
rule and have no governing statutory provisions. In such case the notice
must be reasonable. Mchulty v. Windham, 182 S. C. 462, 189 S. E. 754
(1937); Robison v. Barton, 113 S. C. 212, 102 S. E. 16 (1920).
10 Boland v. Beebe, 186 Misc. 616, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Mun. Ct. 1946).
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of the lease year, and it is preferred that the end of the notice period
coincide with, rather than end before, the last day of the year
reckoned from the commencement of the tenancy, since the notice to
year, 1 be it the
quit takes effect as of the last day of the
12 current
first or a subsequent year of the tenancy.
Although both a tenancy for a year certain, and one from year
to year are estates less than freehold, and independently of statute
or agreement of the parties, bear different requirements as to notice
of termination, there is one further difference between both of the
tenancies under consideration, which warrants some thought. This
difference lies in the duration of the relationship. A tenancy for a
year certain is an estate in land which, as the very name indicates,
endures for a fixed and determinable period.' 3 It must have a definite beginning and a fixed or determinable end. 14 This tenancy arises
by express agreement between the parties. A tenancy from year to
year, however, generally arises in one of three different ways:
(a) By express agreement between the parties, including a lease for
an indefinite term with an annual rental reserved. 15 (b) By a holding over on the part of the tenant at the expiration of a fixed term,
with the consent of the landlord.' 6 (c) By entry under a parol lease
void under the Statute of Frauds, accompanied by payment of rent
in accordance with the terms of the void lease in which rent has been
"ICoudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298 (1890) ; Reeder v. Sayre,
70 N. Y. 180 (1877) ; Kernochan v. Wilkens, 3 App. Div. 596, 38 N. Y. Supp.

236 (1st Dep't 1896); Doe v. Grafton, 18 Q. B. 496, 118 Eng. Rep. 188 (1852) ;

Humphreys v. Franks, 18 C. B. 323, 139 Eng. Rep. 1394 (1856) ; Doe v. Mat.
thews, 11 C. B. 675, 138 Eng. Rep. 640 (1851).
22 Doe v. Mainby, 10 Q. B. 473, 116 Eng. Rep. 180 (1847).

23 "An estate for years is an estate, the duration of which is fixed in units
of a year or multiples or divisions thereof. . . ." Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150
Kan. 449, 94 P. 2d 335; 337 (1939).
'4 Western Transp. Co. v. Lansing, 49 N. Y. 499 (1872); Kavanaugh v.
Cohoes Power, etc., Corp., 114 Misc. 590, 187 N. Y. Supp. 216 (Sup. Ct.
1921); Delk Realty Corp. v. Rubin, 112 Misc. 178, 182 N. Y. Supp. 786 (Sup.
Ct. 1920). In the case of a lease for a period certain, a provision to the effect
that the lease shall be determined on the happening of a contingent event
which may or may not occur before the expiration of the fixed period, will
not prevent the creation of a valid term for years. Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y.
489 (1871); Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282, 97 Eng. Rep. 315 (1757).
Too, a provision in such a lease, for termination at the option of the lessor
or lessee, will not prevent a valid term for years. Tracy v. Albany Exch. Co.,
7 N. Y. 472 (1852); House v. Burr, 24 Barb. 525 (N. Y. 1857); Hersey v.
Giblett, 18 Beav. 174, 52 Eng. Rep. 69 (1854).
15 Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854) ; Douglass v. Seiferd, 18 Misc.
188, 41 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1896) ; Kelly v. Varnes, 52 App. Div. 100,
64 N. Y. Supp. 1040 (4th Dep't 1900). Contra: Hebberd v. Mayo, 97 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
Misc. -, 63
26 Technical Equipment Corp. v. Montauk Garage Corp., N. Y. S. 2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Courts v. Golden, 257 App. Div. 31, 12
N. Y. S. 2d 621 (4th Dep t 1939); Canfield v. Harris & Co., 222 App. Div.
326, 225 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd mere., 248 N. Y. 541, 162

N. E. 517 (1928).
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reserved annually. 17 After the tenancy has been created by any of
these methods, the duration is not fixed and definite, as in the period
certain. "A tenant from year to year has a lease for a year certain,
with a growing interest during every year thereafter, springing out
of the original contract and parcel of it." 18 It is not considered as a
continuous tenancy, but as recommencing every year.' 9 The relationship continues indefinitely, and at the end of any year, it may
be brought to an end, by the act of the parties rather than by the
terms of the agreement as in the period certain.
Having considered some of the varying ramifications of these
tenancies, it is apparent that we must attach considerable importance
to ascertaining which of the two tenancies results from an entry into
possession, accompanied by payment of rent which has been reserved
on an annual basis, under a parol lease which is void because of the
Statute of Frauds, for as we have seen, they impose different responsibilities. The requirements of notice are important to both landlord and tenant, giving the one an opportunity to fill a vacancy, and
allowing the other time to locate in new quarters after receiving an
order to vacate the premises.
In the leading case of Coudert v. Cohn,20 A, the agent of plaintiff's intestate, without the necessary written authority as required
by the Statute of Frauds, 2 ' executed a written lease of certain premises owned by his principal, to the defendants. The term was to
commence on March 1, 1884, and was to continue for two years and
five months, until August, 1886, at an annual rental of $3,000, payable in equal monthly payments, on the last business day of each
month. Defendants entered into possession, occupied the premises
and paid rent up to August, 1885. They then left the premises and
sought to surrender possession to the plaintiff's predecessor, but the
latter declined to accept. Plaintiffs brought this action on the lease.
Held, plaintiffs were entitled to recover the rent to March 1, 1886.
cc... the doctrine now in this state is such that the defendants on
going into possession of the premises and paying rent, became, by
reason of the invalidity of the devise, tenants from year to
year .... ,, 22 In another leading case involving a void parol lease,
the court said, "That oral agreement was void, by the statute of
frauds, as to the term attempted to be created, or any interest in
lands to be derived from it....
the whole agreement was void, and
17 Unglish v. Marvin, 128 N. Y. 380, 28 N. E. 634 (1891), affirming 55 Hun
45, 8 N. Y. Supp. 283 (N. Y. 1889); Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23
N. E. 298 (1890) ; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180 (1877), affirming 6 Hun 562
(N. Y. 1876); Karsch v. Kalabza, 144 App. Div. 305, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1027
(2d Dep't 1911).
1835C. J. Landlord and Tenant § 238 (1924).
19 Austin v. Strong, 47 N. Y. 679 (1872) ; Gandy v. Jubber, 5 B. & S. 78,
122 Eng.. Rep. 762 (1864).
20 118 N. Y. 309, 311, 23 N. E. 298 (1890).
21 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242.
22 118 N. Y. 309, 311, 23 N. E. 298 (1890).
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might have been legally repudiated, as soon as it was made, by either
party to it. But occupation of the lands was taken with the consent
of the owner and the rent was paid to him, in pursuance of and
under the void agreement. In such case the occupation inures, as a
tenancy from year to year." 23
Thus, we see that when a tenant, under a parol lease void because of the Statute of Frauds, enters into possession and pays rent,
which is accepted by the landlord, a tenancy from year to year or
month to month24 arises depending upon the period for which the
rent is reserved.
Seemingly in conflict with this view, is Adams v. City of
Cohoes,25 in which defendant occupied certaih premises belonging to
the plaintiff under a year to year tenancy, the term commencing on
May first of each year. The rent was reserved on a yearly basis,
payable semi-annually. The original tenancy had been created as
of May 1, 1870, and in March, 1875, the plaintiff gave notice of a
raise in rent, to the common council of the defendant. In the following month a resolution was passed by the council, authorizing
the mayor to rent the premises at the increased rate; for a period of
three years commencing on May 1, 1875. No written lease was
executed and the defendant continued in possession, for over 10
years, paying the increased rent semi-annually on the first day of
November and May in each year. On August 1, 1885, defendant
vacated the premises and tendered the key to plaintiff's agent who
refused it. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff was informed of the abandonment. By a recovery in one action and through a judgment by
default in another, plaintiff recovered the rent due up to May 1, 1886.
This action was brought to recover rent for the period from May 1,
1886, to November 1, 1886. ,Plaintiff contended that a tenancy from
year to year existed, and defendant was required to give notice of
termination of such a tenancy; having failed to give such notice, defendant should be held liable for the rent. Defendant on the other
hand contended that a tenancy for a definite period was created, which
required no notice, and gave the right to vacate at the end of any
year. Held, when a tenant holds over after a term of years, his tenancy becomes one from year to year,26 and he has the right to terminate the tenancy at the end of any year without giving the landlord
notice of his intention to do so. The phrase year to year was used
although in effect a tenancy for a year certain was found. The court
23

1876).
24

Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180, 183 (1877), affirmin9 6 Hun 562 (N. Y.

Unglish v. Marvin, 128 N. Y. 380, 28 N. E. 634 (1891); Leunsberry
v. Snyder, 31 N. Y. 514 (1865); Rosenblum v. Westin, 93 Misc. 125, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 1044 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Harnett v. Korscherak, 59 Misc. 457, 110 N. Y.
Supp. 986 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Tress v. Savage, 4 E. & B. 36, 119 Eng. Rep 15

(1854).
25
26

127 N. Y. 175, 28 N. E. 25 (1891).
See note 37 infra,
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also said, that assuming that notice had been necessary, sufficient
notice had been given and that it must be "a very dull landlord" who
could not derive some degree of knowledge that the tenant intended
to terminate the relationship from the facts of abandonment, tender
of key and hiring of new premises.
It has been stated that this decision is dicta,2 7 but the writer
fails to see the case in that light. True, there is dicta to be found
but it is in that part of the holding which states that "Assuming
without deciding, that the landlord was entitled to six months or any
other period of notice . . . would not the tender . . . the quitting
. . .the hiring and actual occupation of other premises . . . answer

the purpose and objects of such notice?" 28 It was necessary to the
decision of this case to first ascertain whether notice was necessary
and if the answer was in the affirmative, it would then devolve upon
the court the duty of determining whether such notice had been
given. Thus, the court here first decided notice was not required
and to bolster the opinion adopted an "even if it were" attitude, concluding that sufficient notice existed to satisfy the requirement had
it been present.
If then the holding in this case, respecting notice, is not dicta,
it is law. But what is the law set forth in this case? Does the case
lay down the rule, that in all cases of a year to year tenancy, no notice is required to terminate such a tenancy in New York, or does
the case stand for a different proposition? That is the crux of our
problem.
Adams v. City of Cohoes has often been cited for the proposition that "Where one enters upon and occupies lands with the consent of the owner, under a parol lease for more than one year, and
so void under the Statute of Frauds, the occupation inures as a
tenancy from year to year; the agreement regulates the relations of
the parties, and may be resorted to, to determine their rights and
duties in all things consistent with a yearly tenancy. No notice to
quit is necessary in New York in such a case." 29 (Italics added.)
As a result of this interpretation, much confpsion now exists in New
York, as respects cases of the type exemplified by Coudert v. Cohn
and Adams v. City of Cohoes. Even though confusion exists, it
would seem that the conflict can be resolved.
27 WALSH, PROPERTY 259 (2d ed. 1937), in footnote 7, states: "In this case,
after stating the tenancy is one which may be ended without notice at the end
of any year, like the tenancy arising from a holding over, the court pointed
out that more than six months had actually been given through the tenant's
quitting the premises and tendering them to the landlord on August 1st, hiring
and occupying other premises, and refusing to pay rent thereafter, the current
year expiring on May 1st, thereafter. Therefore the position taken that no
notice was necessary was not required for the decision of the case and was
dicta."
Contra: I McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT 781-787 (5th ed. 1934).
28
Adams v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175. 184, 28 N. E. 25, 27 (1891).

291 McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT 788 (5th ed. 1934).
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Coudert v. Cohn and those cases which it represents are pure
cases of entry into possession under a parol lease, void because of
the Statute of Frauds. In these cases, we find one fact which is
common to all, this being an attempt to determine the relationship
before the terminal date provided for by the agreement. Under such
circumstances the rule in the Coudert case is applicable and results
in a tenancy from year to year, requiring six months' notice to end
the tenancy. The Adams case differs from these cases in that the
attempt to determine the tenancy occurred after the terminal date of
the void parol agreement. The principle which applies in such a
case is that, the provisions of the void parol lease, govern the tenancy
in all respects not inconsistent with a yearly tenancy, excepting the
duration of the tenancy, and it even applies as respects the duration,
to the extent that if the tenancy continues until the end of the term
provided for by the parol agreement, the relationship will end without notice as in the case of a valid lease for a definite term. 30 Applying this rule to the facts of Adams v. City of Cohoes, we find a parol
lease for three years commencing on May 1, 1875, and therefore the
tenancy automatically determined three years later. The defendant,
however, continued in possession with the consent of the plaintifflandlord and in so doing, defendant became a holdover tenant. The
landlord has the option to treat such a holdover tenant as a trespasser or as a tenant. 31 By accepting the rent through August, 1885,
the landlord elected to treat the defendant as a tenant. In the majority of jurisdictions, when there is such a holdover with the consent of the landlord, and no new agreement, a tenancy from year to
year results.32 In New York, however, the later cases hold that
in such an instance the law implies a continuance of the lease and
the holdover tenancy is for a year certain. 33 In a tenancy for a year
3

OLonghran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205 (1878); Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y.

180 (1877), affirming 6 Hun 562 (N. Y. 1876); Lounsberry -. Snyder, 31
N. Y. 514 (1865); Edwards v. Clemons, 24 Wend. 480 (N. Y. 1840); Doe
v. Stratton, 4 Bing. 446, 130 Eng. Rep. 839 (1828).
-'Kennedy v. City of New York, 196 N. Y. 19, 89 N. E. 360 (1909);
Herter v. Mullen, 159 N. Y. 28, 53 N. E. 700 (1899) ; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133

N. Y. 287, 31 N. E. 94 (1892).
32 Jonesboro Trust Co. v. Harbough, 155 Ark. 416, 244 S. W. 455 (1922);

Hallett v. Barnett, 51 Colo. 434, 118 Pac. 972 (1911) ; City Coal Co. v. Marcus,

95 Conn. 454, 111 At. 857 (1920).
33 Matter of Kinum, 197 App. Div. 839, 189 N. Y. Supp. 536 (3d Dep't
1921); Souhami v. Brownstone, 189 App. Div. 1, 177 N. Y. Supp. 726 (2d

Dep't 1919). Earlier New York cases generally held a tenancy from year to
year. Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio 113 (N. Y. 1845); Sherwood v.
Phillips, 13 Wend. 479 (N. Y. 1835).
WALSH, PRoPERTY 253 (2d ed. 1937), explains this difference between
New York and other jurisdictions as follows: "In New York, however, the
courts hold that the tenancy arising from a holding over and acceptance of
rent, or a holding over and an election to hold the tenant for the rent on the
part of the landlord, as a tenancy for a year certain or a m6nth certain as the
case may be. The reasons for this holding are not obvious and are not expressed by the cases so deciding. The rule probably grew out of loose state-
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certain, it is not necessary to give notice, since the relationship determines at the end of the period.
It is submitted that the Adams case and the Coudert case are
not in conflict, and that the Adams case stands for the proposition
that when a tenant holds over with the consent of his landlord, after
the expiration date provided for by a void parol lease he becomes
a tenant for another year and is not entitled to notice of termination
at the end of the year. Thus the rule is the same as in a case where
the tenant holds over after a valid lease for a period certain. True,
the court makes a statement which is not only misleading but probably is legally groundless: 4

". .

. or when the term is for one year

by reason of the lease being void under the statute of frauds and
occupation for that period, no notice to quit is necessary." This
statement indicates that since a parol lease for a year or less is valid,
a parol lease for a longer period gives rise to a tenancy for a year
certain, permitted by the statute. There is no true legal basis for
this reasoning and it seems only to be based on the idea that by
entering the relationship the parties intended to create a lease for
the longest period permitted by law. This basis is obviously unsound
since the intent of the parties must have been to create a tenancy
to endure for the time set in the parol agreement. The statement
is misleading because it seems to indicate that a tenant who remains
in possession after the first year, becomes a holdover tenant. This
is not the correct rule, since we have already seen that the holdover
can only take place at the end of the period originally agreed upon.35
In its opinion, the court cited with approval portions of Reeder
v. Sayre 86 and similar cases falling within the doctrine of the Coudert
case, and yet it made no attempt to expressly overrule or distinguish
these cases. True, it is possible to do so by implication, but on the
basis of our prior discussion it seems not to have so overruled.
Since, at the end of each holdover year, there may be a new
relationship begun by a further holdover, it would seem to be a relationship that continues indefinitely. On this basis, it is submitted
that while the court calls this tenancy one from year to year,8 7 as
ments in some of the earlier opinions that a tenancy for a year or a month
arose in such case, the court evidently meaning that the tenancy arising was
for at least a year or a month as the case might be since it could not be
brought to an end before the end of the current year or month. From these
statements, followed in later cases, the rule has become settled, more by accident, perhaps, than by design, that a tenancy for a year or a month certain
arises in such case, which ends at the end of each succeeding year or month
without notice. Though the New York courts speak of it as a tenancy from
year to year or from month to month, it is very evident that it is nothing of
the kind, but a tenancy for a fixed period."
34 127 N. Y. 175, 182, 28 N. E. 25, 26 (1891).
35 See note 29 supra.
86 70 N. Y. 180 (1877).
3 The court continues to call it a tenancy from year to year instead of
year certain, though applying rules which normally attach to the year certain
tenancy.
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is held in the majority of jurisdictions, it at the same time realizes
that the tenancy ends without notice each year, and is renewed by a
further holdover.
Conclusion
Therefore, assuming our observations are correct, we find that if
once again there is a prevalence of void parol leases, springing out
of the development of adequate housing facilities and commercial
buildings, or resulting from some other basis, six months' notice
will be required to determine the year to year tenancy arising from
entry into possession under the void parol lease. When, however,
there is a holdover beyond the time provided for by the lease, the
rule in the Adams case will be applicable and no notice will be required to terminate. At the present time, it is an open question as
to whether or not this is the correct rule. The doubt results from
what appears to have been an improper interpretation of the Adams
case, and it is hoped that in the near future, this question will be
resolved by a decision of our Court of Appeals, or an act of the
Legislature.
WILLIAm H. CANNON.

TORT LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs IN NEW YORK

I
Until rather recently, this note might very appropriately have
been entitled "Tort Immunity.. ." rather than "Tort Liability..."
for municipal immunity was the general rule and not the exception
until 1945. In that year, as a result of Bernardine v. City of New
York 1 and other cases to be considered, the common law tort immunity of municipal corporations was finally abrogated. This immunity, derived from the state, was extended to a municipality in
1798 in Russell v. Men of Devon.2 At that time the idea of the
municipal corporate entity was still in a nebulous state and the action
was in effect against the population as a whole. The basis for the
decision was lack of precedent, fear of an infinity of actions and the
absence of corporate funds out of which satisfaction could be had.
Later decisions involved the additional explanations that the municipality derives no profit from the exercise of governmental functions,
1294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. 2d 604 (1945).
22 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798).

